We address the question of designing dynamic menus to sell experience goods. A dynamic menu consists of a set of price-quantity pairs in each period. The quality of the product is initially unknown, and more information is generated through experimentation. The amount of information in the market is increasing in the total quantity sold in each period, and the …rm can control the information ‡ow to the market by adjusting the level of sales. We derive the optimal menu as a function of consumers' beliefs about product quality, and characterize the changes in prices and quantities resulting from information di¤usion and its e¤ects on beliefs.
Introduction

Motivation
Learning plays a crucial role in many markets and other strategic environments. In particular, in markets for new products and services, sellers often face uncertainty over the product's …t for consumers'needs. Consider, for example, new software products and new online services such as DVD rentals, data backup, Internet telephony, and Internet access itself. The quality of these products is only revealed to market participants through consumption, as buyers learn from their own experience and from that of others. Another salient feature of these markets is that consumers'willingness to pay is heterogeneous. This creates the opportunity for …rms to pro…tably adopt price discrimination techniques (such as menu pricing) to elicit the buyers'private information and extract more surplus.
In markets for new products and services, demand conditions evolve over time. As consumers gradually learn about the quality of the product, they modify their purchasing behavior. In consequence, the di¤usion of information induces …rms to modify their menu prices. In particular, in markets for experience goods, the di¤usion of information is endogenous to the behavior of market participants. Buyers and sellers in ‡uence the amount of information conveyed to the market through the level of sales, which is determined by consumers'purchasing behavior and …rms'pricing strategies. Moreover, information about these products'performance is widely and publicly available through an increasing number of channels. 1 The availability of aggregate information provides …rms with an additional instrument in a dynamic environment. Firms are able to condition their product lines and prices on the aggregate opinion of their customers. In this scenario, the forward looking …rm's problem is to screen consumers in order to maximize revenues, while taking into account the informational value of sales. By selling additional units of the product (by o¤ering introductory discounts for example), the …rm accelerates the buyers'learning process, which can lead to higher pro…ts in the long run.
In this paper, we address the question of designing dynamic menus to sell experience goods. We focus on the dynamics of prices and quantities to answer questions such as: should …rms o¤er quantity discounts to high-valuation buyers? How does the range of o¤ered prices and quantities vary over time? Which buyers bene…t from the di¤usion of information?
We develop a dynamic screening model in which a monopolist in each period o¤ers a menu of contracts to a population of buyers. These buyers have private information about their willingness to pay, providing the …rm with an incentive to charge discriminatory prices.
The quality of the product is initially unknown, and more information is generated through experimentation. As purchases are made, both the …rm and the consumers observe signals about the product's quality and, as a result, revise their beliefs. The amount of information in the market is increasing in the total quantity sold in each period. The …rm can therefore control the information ‡ow to the market by adjusting the level of sales. Learning about the product occurs faster as more units are sold, and so the …rm may use low introductory prices.
The uncertainty about the quality of the product introduces a new dynamic element into the standard trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rent extraction. More speci…cally, the determination of the quantity levels supplied to each buyer is the combination of three e¤ects. The …rst of these components is one of information generation. Since learning occurs through consumption, each unit sold provides additional information value. This leads the …rm to sell additional units when uncertainty about quality is high and beliefs are more responsive to news. The second component is related to e¢ ciency. As consumers' beliefs improve, their willingness to pay is higher, hence creating the opportunity to realize larger gains from trade. Therefore the …rm o¤ers larger quantities in these cases. The third e¤ect and …nal component is an adverse selection e¤ect. Positive signals about quality increase the spread in buyers' valuations for the product. This makes the incentive compatibility constraints more di¢ cult to satisfy, and induces the …rm to o¤er lower quantity levels to buyers with low willingness to pay.
While the …rm simultaneously pursues the dual objectives of generating information and screening consumers, the balance between the two shifts over time. Initially, the …rm increases the level of sales to all buyers above the static optimum: it sacri…ces short-term gains in order to invest in information production. As more information is revealed, the …rm gradually shifts to a policy that targets the consumers with the highest valuations, in order to extract more surplus. This policy may eventually exclude low-valuation buyers from the market, even if the product's underlying quality is in fact high. As consumers' beliefs improve, the cost of providing incentives to high-valuation buyers increases due to the adverse selection e¤ect. This leads the …rm to reduce the supply of its product to low-valuation buyers. Consequently, the quantity levels o¤ered to a low-valuation buyer need not be monotonic in the beliefs about product quality. The model also predicts that successful products should be characterized by a greater price dispersion and a wider variety of available quantities. In particular, the …rm expands the range of o¤ered quantities through the addition of new options both at the top and at the bottom of the menu.
In the model, learning takes place based on aggregate information. More precisely, we assume that each consumer's action (quantity choice) and payo¤ (experienced quality level) is observable to other buyers and to the …rm. In other words, all information is publicly available to the market. While this is an important assumption, it suits the purpose of this paper for two reasons. First, in large markets, consumers realize that others'experience is also indicative of the underlying product quality and take public information into account. More importantly, this paper is interested in modeling the …rm's optimal response to variations in demand arising from the arrival of new information. As such, it focuses only on information the …rm that can condition its strategies upon. In an alternative model, demand for the product would be determined by consumers'private experiences, while the …rm only observes the market's average experience. In the context of this paper, the introduction of private information would add noise to the demand process, but would not alter the qualitative properties of the …rm's behavior. We therefore abstract away from further heterogeneity in demand, and only consider the market's observable aggregate experience.
Examples
The model is well suited to analyze several di¤erent markets. Consider …rst the market for online DVD rentals. Companies like Net ‡ix or Blockbuster allow consumers to subscribe to plans specifying the number of movies they may rent at the same time. While buyers di¤er in their personal willingness to pay for watching DVD movies, the quality of the recommender system is a common component in determining the overall quality of the service. With this interpretation, each rented movie constitutes an informative experiment about the product's quality. It is reasonable to assume that customers with higher willingness to pay also care more about the …t of the recommendation to their own preferences. Furthermore, both the prices for each plan and the plan choice by the consumer are easily adjustable. Finally, Net ‡ix subscribers exchange information about their experience through a surprisingly large number of channels.
2 This means that information about the overall performance of the service circulates very rapidly. Net ‡ix launched the rental service in 2001 and held a near-monopoly position for several years. Figure 1 reports the menus o¤ered by Net ‡ix over the years 2002 through 2005, that is, immediately before Blockbuster established itself as a serious competitor. In 2002, the Net ‡ix menu o¤er consisted of two plans, allowing for the simultaneous rental of two and four titles, respectively. The variety of the plans o¤ered increased over time, as the service soon proved to be a clear success.
3 In 2003, Net ‡ix modi…ed its o¤er of plans to a four-item The market for enterprise software provides an alternate application. An emerging contractual arrangement in this industry is given by software-as-a-service (SaaS). Under this contractual form, …rms have the option of renting a given number of licenses for the use of a given software product (for example, a customer database system or an online backup program). Larger …rms need to rent more licenses seats and bene…t more from a higher quality product. In this market, each employee using the software constitutes an experiment for product quality, so that the number of seats may be directly tied to the arrival rate of information. Moreover, the rental contracts and their corresponding prices are easily adjustable. Finally, network externalities between …rms are not a signi…cant issue in enterprise software (as it is designed for internal use), making the private values framework realistic. 5 4 We are ignoring plans which impose a limit to the number of monthly rentals. If we were to include them, then the lowest quantity would be given by a one DVD at a time, up to four per month.
5 Larkin (2008) provides a detailed analysis of some frequently used contractual arrangements in this industry.
Related Literature
This paper enriches the screening literature by extending nonlinear pricing techniques beyond the canonical, static environment to a model where information is revealed over time. It therefore builds upon the classic studies in price discrimination, such as Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) . At the same time, it is tightly connected to continous time models in which the information ‡ow is controlled by one or more of the agents. Examples of these papers include the works of Bolton and Harris (1999) , Keller and Rady (1999) , and Moscarini and Smith (2001) on strategic experimentation, as well as the continuoustime reputation game analyzed by Faingold and Sannikov (2007) . In particular, we adopt the method of Faingold and Sannikov (2007) for showing existence of and uniqueness of a solution to the …rm's problem.
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Our analysis also complements several models of introductory and dynamic pricing under product quality uncertainty. The main work in this area is due to Bergemann and Välimäki (1997 and to Villas-Boas (2004 . In particular, Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) analyze a duopoly model of price competition with vertically di¤erentiated products. In Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) , market participants are uncertain about the degree of vertical di¤erentiation of the two …rm's products. In this paper, as in Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) , consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their willingness to pay. However, we allow consumers to have multi-unit demands and the …rm to price discriminate.
The problem of generating information through sales, was …rst studied, in the context of a screening model, by Braden and Oren (1994) . In their model, a monopolist is uncertain about the probability distribution over each buyer's willingness to pay. One buyer arrives in each period, and her choice from the …rm's menu provides information about this distribution. In contrast, in our paper both sides of the market are learning, and the inference procedure is based on aggregate information. This framework provides a more realistic description of markets with a large number of customers (such as the DVD rentals or the enterprise software markets).
The techniques used in this paper also relate to the model of dynamic regulation of Lewis and Yildirim (2002) . In their model, a planner o¤ers a menu of contracts to a …rm whose production costs decrease by a deterministic amount, but where innovation follows a stochastic process. Compared to Lewis and Yildirim (2002) , our analysis emphasizes learning and the buyer-speci…c e¤ects of information. With a slight change in interpretation, our framework could also be used to study repeated procurement contracts, when the regulator and the …rm share uncertainty over a production cost parameter.
In addition to this theoretical body of work, a recent empirical literature attempts to quantify the importance of learning considerations on consumers' dynamic purchasing behavior. In these studies, consumer learn from their individual experience, revise their beliefs about product quality, and consequently modify their choices. A non-exhaustive list of empirical papers on learning and dynamic consumer choice includes Ackerberg (2003) , Akçura, Gonul, and Petrova (2004) , Crawford and Shum (2005) , Erdem and Keane (1996) , Goettler and Clay (2006) , Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2007) , and Israel (2005) . From a di¤erent perspective, Hitsch (2006) and Song and Chintagunta (2003) analyze learning about the demand on the …rm's side, but focus on investment decisions such as product adoption or exit, not on pricing strategies. This paper complements this literature with a theoretical framework for nonlinear pricing, in which …rms'learning is just as important as buyers', and in which information is obtained from aggregate experience.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the model, section 3 derives the equilibrium conditions and discusses the comparative statics properties of the optimal menu; section 4 speci…es the model to a linear utility -quadratic cost structure and fully characterizes the equilibrium menu; section 5 derives predictions for the intertemporal patterns of prices and quantities; section 6 extends our analysis to a competitive setting through a duopoly example; and section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
Payo¤s
We consider a dynamic model with a monopolist …rm and a continuum of small consumers. Consumers purchase repeatedly and have multi-unit demands in each period. Each consumer's valuation for the …rm's product depends both on a private value and a common value component. We denote by an idiosyncratic, private value component, representing the buyer's personal willingness to pay for the product. For each buyer, belongs to the interval = [ L ; H ]. The idiosyncratic component is the consumer's private information. It is distributed in the population according to a distribution
Assumption 1 (Monotone Hazard Rate) F ( ) satis…es the monotone hazard rate condition:
We denote by a common value component representing the inherent quality of the product. This parameter may only take one of two values, 2 f L ; H g with 0 < L < H . Each consumer's valuation for q units of a product is a separable function of the product's quality and of the consumer's willingness to pay . The complete information utility of a consumer with willingness to pay , who purchases q units of a product of quality , for a total charge of p, is given by
The function u (q) is assumed to be strictly increasing. As a consequence, the consumer's utility function U ( ; ; q; p) displays the single crossing property in ( ; q). Furthermore, quality and personal taste are complement goods for the consumer. We assume that each buyer makes a purchase decision in every period, and that she can freely switch between di¤erent quantity levels. We normalize each buyer's outside option to zero. Finally, we assume that production costs are given by a strictly increasing function c (q). Product quality is initially unknown to both the …rm and the consumers, and all market participants share the common prior belief
At each time t, the expected product quality, given current beliefs t , is denoted by
In each period, a monopolist posts a menu of price-quantity pairs. We require the …rm to price anonymously, and we allow for prices and quantities to be ‡exibly adjusted. In a direct mechanism, the …rm's strategy is a pair of functions q t : ! R + and p t : ! R + in each period. These functions determine the quantity level and the total charges assigned to each buyer . Suppose each buyer purchases quantity level q t ( ) and pays total charges of p t ( ). The …rm then obtains ‡ow pro…ts of
In our environment, the social gains from trade realized by selling quantity q to type , when product quality is , are given by u (q) c (q). In order to ensure that the …rm's problem has an interior solution, we introduce the following assumptions on the social gains from trade. 
For all and ,
3. For all and , lim
Information and Learning
Information about product quality is obtained through consumption. The level of aggregate sales determines the total number of experiments with the product. In turn, the level of experimentation in ‡uences the rate at which the …rm and the consumers learn about its quality. We assume that beliefs t evolve according to the following di¤usion process:
where dz t denotes the standard Wiener process. We also de…ne the total quantity sold at time t as:
In the Appendix, we present a model which provides a micro foundation for the belief process based on individual signals. At this stage, note that beliefs follow a martingale, and thus the process has a zero drift. We de…ne following function:
The function ( t ) captures the marginal contribution of each unit sold to the variance of the belief process
The variance is increasing in the degree of dispersion t (1 t ) and in the signal-to-noise ratio ( H L ) / . Beliefs evolve more quickly when current uncertainty is high, and when signals are precise. Finally, we stress that the evolution of the belief process is endogenously determined, since the total quantity sold Q t depends on the …rm's pricing and on the consumers'purchasing decisions.
In this environment, the …rm can therefore control the rate of information ‡ow to the market, by adjusting the level of sales. In this sense, the paper is linked to the strategic experimentation literature, as well as to the continuous-time reputation model of Faingold and Sannikov (2007) . In that paper, the long-lived player's actions a¤ect the information ‡ow received by the short-lived players. Our screening model di¤ers from Faingold and Sannikov (2007) along two essential dimensions. First, in our model the …rm does not know its own type (unlike the long lived player in their reputation game), and is learning about it along with the short-lived players. Second, the …rm cannot manipulate the buyers' beliefs, but only a¤ect the speed at which learning takes place. Nevertheless, we will be able to apply the method of proof of Faingold and Sannikov (2007) to show existence and uniqueness of a solution in our model, as we discuss in the next section (and in the Appendix).
Equilibrium Analysis
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis, starting with a characterization of the incentive compatible menus of contracts. In our model, each individual buyer has a negligible impact on the information ‡ow. Therefore, each buyer chooses the price-quantity pair that maximizes her expected utility, given beliefs t and the …rm's menu o¤er. The two-point prior on quality ensures that, at every point in time, the value of t is a su¢ cient statistic for the …rm's problem. Therefore, we denote by (q ( t ; ) ; p ( t ; )) the menu o¤ered by the …rm when the market belief is given by t . We also denote by U ( t ; ; 0 ) the expected utility of a buyer with beliefs t and willingness to pay who purchases the item (q ( t ;
intended for a buyer of type 0 :
Let U ( t ; ) = U ( t ; ; ) denote buyer 's indirect utility when reporting truthfully. The incentive compatibility constraints for the …rm's problem are then given by the consumer's …rst and second order conditions for truthful revelation:
Each buyer's valuation for q units of the product depends positively on her beliefs t . Positive signals therefore allow the …rm to charge higher prices. However, when beliefs become more optimistic, the …rm must concede higher information rents to the buyers, as shown by equation (4). This e¤ect is due to the complementarity between product quality and buyers'willingness to pay. As beliefs t increase, the di¤erence between any two buyers' willingness to pay also increases, creating stronger incentives to misreport one's type. This means that for high values of t the incentive compatibility constraints are harder to satisfy. Finally, the buyers'participation constraints are given by U ( t ; ) 0, for all t and .
Myopic Benchmark
We now provide a benchmark for the …rm's problem. We consider an impatient (myopic) …rm, who only maximizes the current ‡ow pro…ts. By expressing total charges p ( t ; ) in terms of the buyers'indirect utilities U ( t ; ), we can rewrite the …rm's ‡ow pro…ts as
The myopic …rm maximizes ( t ; q; U ) subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (4) and (5) and to the participation constraint (6). As in many screening problems, Assumption 1 ensures that (5) holds in equilibrium. We then substitute the incentive compatibility constraint (4) in the objective, and integrate by parts. As a result, we can express the …rm's ‡ow pro…ts as a function of only beliefs t and quantities q ( t ; ). Denote by ( ) ,
(1 F ( )) /f ( ) the virtual valuation of buyer . The …rm's ‡ow pro…ts are then given by
and the myopic equilibrium pro…t function is de…ned as
The myopically optimal menu is determined by maximizing (7) pointwise. The …rst order condition for quantity provision is given by
The myopic equilibrium quantity level q m ( t ; ) is then given by the solution to (8), whenever this solution is positive, and by zero otherwise. The …rm equalizes marginal cost and the buyer's marginal utility. Notice that the expected product quality ( t ) acts as scale parameter for marginal utilities, and hence for equilibrium quantity provision. The following proposition describes the key properties of the myopic solution.
Proposition 1 (Myopic Solution)
1. The myopic quantity q m ( t ; ) is strictly increasing in both t and .
2. The myopic pro…t function m ( t ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in t .
Higher beliefs about product quality improve every buyer's willingness to pay, and the …rm …nds it pro…table to sell a larger number of units. Convexity of the myopic pro…t function implies, that as beliefs improve, the …rm can also charge higher unit prices. The convexity of the myopic pro…t function has implications for the …rm's incentives to learn about the quality of its product. In the myopic world, the …rm would be willing to pay in order to enter a fair bet between the two states = L and = H . De…ne the complete information average pro…t as
For all interior t , we then have
Dynamic Solution
We now turn to the dynamic version of the problem. A strategy for the …rm consists of a sequence of quantity supply functions q t : ! R + . The corresponding total charges are determined by the incentive compatibility constraints. Given the prior belief 0 , the …rm's objective function may then be written as
where the evolution of beliefs t is given by the law of motion (1). Using the law of motion for beliefs and Itô's Lemma, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for this maximization problem is given by
The expression for rV ( t ) di¤ers from the ‡ow pro…ts ( t ; q) only through the term
. This term is proportional to the total quantity sold Q, and its sign depends on whether V 00 ( t ) ? 0. Each unit sold provides an informative signal whose e¤ect on beliefs depends on the variance ( t ). Therefore, the term Q ( t ) V 00 ( t ) can be interpreted as the informational value generated through sales. In particular, the marginal value of information is given by the second derivative of the value function V 00 ( t ). The convexity of the value function is related to the …rm's incentives to amplify the variance of the belief process, and hence to learn faster about the product's quality. Finally, note that information has no value when t = 0 and t = 1, since beliefs no longer change in those cases. Writing the HJB equation (11) more explicitly, we obtain an expression that may be maximized pointwise:
We now prove existence of a solution to the …rm's dynamic problem. We then return to the optimal menu of contracts and illustrate the role of the value of information in determining the equilibrium prices and quantities. Our approach to proving existence of a solution consists of turning the HJB equation into a second order di¤erential equation with the two boundary conditions rV (0) = m (0) and rV (1) = m (1). Since t is the independent variable in our boundary value problem, we drop time subscripts. Our existence and uniqueness result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness)
1. There exists a unique solution V ( ) to the HJB equation (12). V ( ) is C 2 and satis…es
The policy function q ( ; ) maximizing the right hand side of (12) pointwise is the unique optimal control. It is continuous and di¤erentiable in and .
3. The solution V ( ) coincides with the supremum value ( ) of (10).
The logic of the proof of (1.) and (2.) follows the one in Faingold and Sannikov (2007) , who …rst developed a method to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution given the singularity points of the di¤erential equation. The proof of (3.) uses a veri…cation theorem from Fleming and Soner (2006) .
We now derive some elementary properties of the policy function. For this purpose, a prior question to be addressed is whether the …rm assigns positive value to information.
Theorem 2 (Convexity of the Value Function)
The …rm's value function V ( ) is convex in :
Theorem 2 shows that the …rm's value function inherits the convexity property of the myopic pro…t function. A convex value function implies that the forward-looking …rm is willing to give up some revenue in the short run (i.e. to depart from m ( )) in order to generate more information through sales. We relate the degree of patience and the incentives to invest in information in the following comparative statics result. We normalize the …rm's payo¤s by focusing on the return (or annuity) function rV ( ).
Proposition 2 (Value of Information)
1. The return function rV ( ) and the value of information ( ) V 00 ( ) are decreasing in and in r; for all .
For all H and
These results show that the …rm's patience level, the precision of the available signals, and the relevance of the learning process provide the …rm with greater incentives to experiment. A measure of the relevance of the learning process is given by the di¤erence between the two possible quality levels.
Properties of the Equilibrium Menus
We now turn to the properties of the equilibrium menus of contracts. Pointwise maximization of the right-hand side of the HJB equation (12) yields an expression for the optimal quantity provision, as a function of the value of information V 00 ( t ). The equilibrium q ( t ; ) is given by the solution to the …rst order condition
whenever this solution is positive, and by zero otherwise. This condition di¤ers from that of the myopic …rm because of the marginal value of information. In particular, the forwardlooking …rm equalizes marginal cost to the buyer's marginal utility, augmented by the marginal value of information ( t ) V 00 ( t ). Notice that the …rm's incentives to experiment, captured by ( t ) V 00 ( t ), are uniform across buyers, as this term does not depend on the buyer's type . We summarize our comparative statics results for the forward-looking …rm's problem in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Quantity Supply)
1. The quantity level q ( ; ) is everywhere higher than the myopic quantity q m ( ; ).
2. The quantity level q ( ; ) is increasing in the value of information ( ) V 00 ( ).
Proposition 3 shows that the comparative statics results of Proposition 2 have important implications for the properties of the equilibrium menus. In particular, the …rm experiments by selling quantity levels larger than the myopic optima for all and . This leads, for example, to a (weakly) larger set of types receiving positive quantities in the dynamic solution than in the myopic one. Combining the results of propositions 2 and 3, we obtain that the number of additional units sold is increasing in the …rm's patience level, and in the precision of the signals. However, the value of information ( ) V 00 ( ), as well as quantities and market coverage levels, are typically not monotonic in beliefs. In particular, the …rm has no incentive to experiment when beliefs are degenerate and 2 f0; 1g. The quantity levels q ( ; ) in the direct mechanism can be linked to the actual pricequantity menus o¤ered by the …rm in an indirect mechanism. We can represent the …rm's strategy through a nonlinear price functionp ( ; q). This function de…nes the total amount charged by the …rm for q units of the product, when the market beliefs are given by . Similarly, we denote by ( ; q) the buyer who purchases quantity level q in equilibrium, as a function of the beliefs. Consumers maximize their utility given the …rm's current menu o¤er. This allows us to characterize the marginal prices charged by the …rm on each unit. The equilibrium marginal prices must in fact solve the buyer's …rst order condition
Since any quantity sold is de…ned by equation (13) for some type , the equilibrium marginal prices are given byp
.
Proposition 4 (Marginal Prices)
1. Marginal pricesp q ( ; q) are everywhere lower than in the myopic benchmark.
2. Marginal pricesp q ( ; q) are decreasing in the value of information ( ) V 00 ( ).
As in all screening problems, a precise characterization of prices requires knowledge of the distribution of types F ( ). However, regardless of the distribution of types, Proposition 4 shows that experimentation reduces the marginal prices paid by each consumer. The …rm is willing to give up revenue (by lowering prices) to induce experimentation, while the consumer has no incentives to pay for information.
To summarize our results so far, the solution to the …rm's dynamic optimization problem implies higher sales and lower marginal prices, compared to the myopic benchmark. The level of experimentation depends positively on the …rm's patience level and on the precision of the available signals. It also depends positively on the di¤erence between the two possible quality levels of the product. In the next section, we examine how the optimal menus adjust to the evolution of beliefs for the case of linear utility and quadratic costs.
Linear-Quadratic Model
In this section, we adopt the Mussa and Rosen (1978) functional form assumptions: u (q) = q and c (q) = q 2 =2. We characterize the solution for a setting in which all buyers participate, and discuss the properties of the equilibrium menu with positive discounting. We turn to the undiscounted limit to describe the e¤ects of information more in detail. We then discuss the properties of the equilibrium menu that extend to the case of small positive discounting. Finally, we extend the analysis to the case of imperfect market coverage. The …rst order condition (13) can now be written as
This explicit expression for quantity provision allows us to separately identify the role of the value of information in determining the evolution of the equilibrium menus as a function of beliefs.
Full Market Coverage and Positive Discounting
Full market coverage is obtained in equilibrium when ( L ) > 0. In this case, the myopic solution, in terms of quantities and total charges, is given by
The following proposition relates the equilibrium menus to the myopic benchmark.
Proposition 5 (Full Market Coverage)
1. The equilibrium quantities and prices are
The marginal value of information is
A few remarks are in order. First, each type receives ( ) V 00 ( ) units over and above the myopic quantity level. These additional units constitute the marginal level of experi-mentation. In this setting, the marginal level of experimentation is constant across types. The number of additional units ( ) V 00 ( ) need not, however, be monotonic in beliefs . Second, quantities increase above q m by ( ) V 00 ( ), but prices only exceed p m by ( ) L ( ) V 00 ( ). This means that each additional unit sold is priced uniformly at ( ) L . In other words, the …rm charges the lowest type's willingness to pay. Hence it cannot extract any more surplus on the additional units sold. This is a consequence of the fact that buyers are not willing to pay for experimentation, and need to be o¤ered a low enough price in order to be convinced to purchase more. Third, unlike many experimentation models, the value of information does not only depend on the di¤erence rV ( ) m ( ), but also directly on the current level of demand, captured by ( ) E [ ]. This term, in fact, is equal to the total quantity sold by the myopic seller. As such, it is a measure of the "default"level of experimentation. It in ‡uences the speed of the learning process in the absence of any additional investment in information production by the …rm.
Another implication of Proposition 5 is that the e¤ects of new information on the supplied quantity levels depend on the consumer's willingness to pay . In particular, types with a virtual valuation above the average E [ ] bene…t more from an improvement in beliefs than those with below-average virtual valuations. At the same time, di¤erences between the quantity levels o¤ered to di¤erent buyers do not depend on the level of experimentation. The following proposition focuses on the variations in the price-quantity pairs o¤ered to each consumer. These variations constitute the basis for our results on the dynamics of the equilibrium menu's variety.
Proposition 6 (Contract Variety)
1. For all > 0 , quantity di¤erences q ( ; ) q ( ; 0 ) are increasing and linear in .
2. For all > 0 , di¤erences in total prices charged p ( ; ) p ( ; 0 ) are increasing and convex in .
If we let = H and 0 = L , this result implies that higher values of beliefs bring about a wider range of options, in terms of o¤ered quantities, and a higher dispersion of total charges. We would now like to explicitly characterize the behavior of the equilibrium menus as a function of beliefs . This requires solving the di¤erential equation (15) for the …rm's value function. Unfortunately, this di¤erential equation does not have an analytical solution, as it is a second order, nonlinear problem. However, we are able to obtain closed form solutions by analyzing the undiscounted version of the …rm's problem.
No Discounting
For the analysis of the undiscounted version of the problem, we adopt the strong long run average criterion. 7 This approach identi…es the limit of the discounted policy functions as the discount rate approaches zero. The solution provided through the strong long run average criterion therefore preserves the qualitative properties of the optimal solution for small discount rates. This criterion also allows us to preserve the recursive formulation of the problem, and to obtain analytical solutions for the policy function. More importantly, the analysis in the previous sections has established a clear link between the …rm's patience level and the e¤ects of learning. As the latter are the focus of this paper, considering high degrees of patience removes the risk of assuming learning away because of a high discount rate.
With reference to our model, the strong long run average criterion may be informally summarized as follows: we know beliefs will convergence either to L or to H . In the limit for r ! 0, given beliefs , the return function rV ( ) converges to the long run average payo¤ v ( ) de…ned in (9). However, many policy functions attain the long run average value v ( ), independently of their …nite time properties. 8 The main contribution of Dutta (1991) is to prove that the policy function maximizing the undiscounted stream of payo¤s, net of their long run averages
represents the limit (for r ! 0) of the policy functions maximizing the discounted stream of payo¤s (10). The strong long run average solution combines the …nite time properties of catching-up optimality and the recursive representation of criteria like the limit of the means. We can therefore write the undiscounted analog of the HJB equation (11) as
where now ( ) V 00 ( ) represents the limit marginal value of information. This value does not vanish as r ! 0. On the contrary, Proposition 2 showed that the value of information is increasing in the …rm's patience level. In the undiscounted case, we directly solve for this value in closed form. In particular, in the linear quadratic case, the undiscounted equilibrium quantity supply function is given by
Theorem 3 (Undiscounted Equilibrium Quantities)
1. The equilibrium quantity q ( ; ) is strictly concave in for all :
2. There exists a threshold type~ such that q ( ; ) is …rst increasing then decreasing in for all types ~ , and strictly increasing in for all types >~ .
The main result of Theorem 3 is that experimentation has buyer-dependent implications for the evolution of equilibrium quantities. Contrary to the myopic case, a set of types
does not always receive a larger number of units as beliefs improve. In particular, the threshold type~ satis…es the following equation:
The set of types whose consumption levels are nonmonotonic in beliefs is increasing in the relative quality di¤erence ( H L ) = H and in the dispersion of buyers'valuations. This is a consequence of the fact that the …rm's pro…t p ( ; ) c (q ( ; )) is convex in . Therefore, an increase in the spread of the distribution F ( ) improves the …rm's pro…ts makes the learning process more signi…cant. The concavity of equilibrium quantities suggests that experimentation is higher for intermediate values of the beliefs. Figure 2 (a) con…rms this intuition. In this …gure, we show the quantity levels supplied to three di¤erent buyers < 0 < 00 as a function of the market belief . The lowest type has a zero virtual valuation, and would never be served in the static solution. Figure 2 (b) illustrates the equilibrium total charges. Consistent with the result from Proposition 6, the di¤erences between total charges paid by di¤erent buyers are increasing and convex in beliefs.
The main properties of the equilibrium menu are best understood by decomposing the implications of the arrival of information into three e¤ects. The …rst component is one of informational value. Each unit sold generates additional value to the …rm by facilitating learning. This e¤ect is highest for intermediate values of the market belief. Conversely, as beliefs approach zero or one, the value of information declines, and so do the incentives for additional quantity provision. This e¤ect in ‡uences all types in the same way, since the informational content of a unit sold is independent of the buyer purchasing it. However, the e¤ects of new information are not uniform across buyers because of the second and third components. 
The second component is related to e¢ ciency. When positive news arrive, consumers are willing to pay more for each unit, and gains from trade increase. This e¤ect is stronger for high consumer types, who bene…t the most from a quality increase.
The third e¤ect is related to rent extraction. Under adverse selection, the di¤erential increase in buyer's valuations tightens the incentive compatibility constraints and increases the informational rents. This raises the cost of providing the appropriate incentives to high-valuation buyers. To understand this, remember that in the two-type static adverse selection model, the high type's rent is given by
The equivalent formulation for this model would be
which is increasing in . In other words, positive signals generate additional costs to the seller, driving down consumption for low-valuation buyers as beliefs approach one. In principle, the …rst two e¤ects could su¢ ce to determine decreasing quantity provision for some types, as goes to one. However, in several cases, the adverse selection e¤ect is necessary in order to overcome the myopic incentives that lead to increasing quantities. The uniform distribution with H < 2 L (i.e. under full market coverage) is one such case.
The balance of the value of information, e¢ ciency, and rent extraction e¤ects determines a set of types for which quantity provision is nonmonotonic in : These types consume the largest quantities for intermediate values of , where the value of information is highest. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the construction of the equilibrium quantities from the marginal value of information and the myopic solution for two di¤erent buyers.
The equilibrium quantities are given by the vertical sum of the curve ( ) V 00 ( ) with each straight line q m ( ; ). The shape of the resulting quantity allocation depends on the buyer's willingness to pay . Finally, notice that the value of information (hence the difference between the equilibrium and the myopic quantities for each type) peaks at a value of lower than one-half. To understand why this is the case, consider equation (16). The total informational value Q ( ) V 00 ( ) is equal to the di¤erence between long run average and current ‡ow pro…ts v ( ) ( ; q). The marginal value of information ( ) V 00 ( ) therefore indicates the contribution of each unit sold to "compensate" for this di¤erence, (v ( ) ( ; q)) =Q. The numerator of this ratio depends positively on the degree of uncertainty (1 ), which is a measure of how much beliefs can be in ‡uenced by the signals observed in the current period. At the same time, the total quantity Q is increasing in , implying that the ratio of the two terms is decreasing at = 1=2. In words, each (additional) unit's contribution to the learning process depends negatively on the level of sales, which determines the speed of the learning process in the absence of any (additional) experimentation.
Nonlinear Prices
Combining our results on contract variety and nonmonotonic quantity provision, we can conclude that the arrival of good news extends the range of o¤ered quantities. In particular, when the value of information is initially high, an improvement in beliefs reduces the quantity level o¤ered to the lowest-valuation buyers. This e¤ect corresponds to a strategy based on introductory pricing. When uncertainty is high, even low-valuation buyers are induced to purchase larger quantities through quantity discounts. As the market obtains positive signals, buyers' valuations increase, but introductory discounts are greatly reduced. As a consequence, low-valuation buyers reduce their demands. This feature distinguishes the response of the equilibrium menu to the arrival of information from that of the myopic …rm's menu. As the market obtains positive signals, the myopic …rm increases the quantity level supplied to all buyers. Figure 4 compares the equilibrium menus (q;p ( ; q)) o¤ered by a myopic …rm (4(a)) with those o¤ered by a forward-looking …rm (4(b)), as described in this section, for several values of . Figure 4 (b) also highlights the response of the lowest available quantity to the arrival of information. The slope of the equilibrium menus corresponds to the marginal prices. When buyers' types are uniformly distributed, marginal prices are given bŷ
In the undiscounted uniform case, marginal prices are convex in . Learning has an intuitive e¤ect on marginal prices. Marginal prices are increasing in for all quantity levels, provided the di¤erence in quality levels H L is not too high. Conversely, marginal prices are U-shaped in for all q if learning is relevant enough. Finally, note that the convex costs assumption is responsible for the increasing marginal pricesp( ; q) > 0. We use the linear-quadratic setting since it allows for the most straightforward illustration of our results. However, our formulation is essentially equivalent to a model with constant marginal costs and a non separable, quadratic utility function of the form U ( ; ; q) = ( )2 =2.
This demand speci…cation, as well as others used in Maskin and Riley (1984) , would yield quantity discounts (p( ; q) < 0) for all ; q. As we have shown, the analysis of the undiscounted problem under full market coverage delivers explicit solutions that provide insights into the properties of the equilibrium menus. We now extend our …ndings, by separately relaxing the assumptions of in…nite patience and full market coverage.
Small Positive Discounting
Our …rst result under small positive discounting uses bounds for the convexity of the value function to establish the concavity of equilibrium quantities in the discounted case. This procedure presents some di¢ culties, since the second derivative of the value function is unbounded when goes to zero or one. The only exceptions are given by the myopic pro…ts (since 00 m ( ) is a constant), and by the undiscounted pro…ts (since v 00 ( ) 0). In general, as r decreases, the return function rV ( ) moves from the quadratic function m ( ) to the linear function v ( ). As in the case of the function (x (1 x)) k for k 2 [1; 2], the second derivative is equal to in…nity at x = 0 and x = 1, except for the two limit cases, k = 1 and k = 2. Our …rst result extends the concavity property of quantity provision through a careful treatment of the order of limits.
Proposition 7 (Concave Quantities)
For any " 2 (0; 1), there exists a value of the discount rate r " such that, for all r < r " , the quantity supply function q ( ; ) is concave in for all 2 ["; 1 "] and for all 2 .
Our second result establishes that all o¤ered quantities are strictly increasing in beliefs when = 0. More importantly, it identi…es the minimum patience requirements that allow us to extend the nonmonotonicity of quantity to an arbitrary set of low-valuation buyers. Let~ be the threshold type de…ned by (18).
Proposition 8 (Nonmonotonic Quantity Provision)
1. The quantity q ( ; ) is increasing in at = 0 for all r and all .
2. For every <~ , there exists a value of the discount rate r such that, whenever r < r ,
In the next subsection, we relax the full market coverage assumption and analyze the properties of the equilibrium market coverage level.
Partial Market Coverage
When ( L ) < 0, it is not always optimal for the monopolist to serve the entire market. We focus on the undiscounted version of the problem and apply the strong long-run average criterion. For buyers who receive positive quantity provision in equilibrium, the optimal sales level is characterized by …rst order condition (14):
However, the equilibrium value of information a¤ects the set of buyers receiving positive quantities. In other words, ( ) V 00 ( ) determines the lowest type served ( ). After substituting the optimal policy rule as a function of ( ) V 00 ( ), we can rewrite the …rm's problem as follows:
The critical type is determined through the equation q ( ; ( )) = 0. In order to obtain a closed form expression for ( ) V 00 ( ), and hence for q ( ; ), we assume types are uniformly distributed. We then characterize the equilibrium quantities and market shares in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 (Market Coverage)
The undiscounted equilibrium quantities and market coverage level are given by:
The incentives to experiment lead the …rm to serve a larger fraction of types, compared to the myopic solution. These incentives are clearly strongest when the value of information is highest. Market coverage is therefore highest for intermediate values of , where information is more valuable. However, as in the case of full market coverage, the fraction of buyers served attains a maximum for values of lower than 1=2.
The case of partial market coverage allows us to clearly show how the arrival of new information is bene…cial for some high valuation buyers, but not for others. Figure 5 (on the next page) shows the indirect utility levels for three buyers, as a function of beliefs.
In particular, the lowest valuation buyer shown ( 
Intertemporal Patterns
We now consider the dynamics of the equilibrium menus. We derive predictions for the intertemporal evolution of the quantities and prices. The …rst part of the analysis considers the expected intertemporal patterns from the point of view of market participants. Their beliefs t follow the di¤usion process described by equation (1). Therefore, by Itô's Lemma, any di¤erentiable function of beliefs h ( t ; ), such as prices and quantities, also follows a di¤usion process. In particular, the evolution of the process dh ( t ; ) is given by
Since E [d t ] = 0, the sign of the drift component of the process dh ( t ; ) is determined by the second derivative. In other words, the concavity and convexity properties of any function h ( t ; ) may be directly translated into statements about the sign of its unconditional expected change.
Proposition 10 (Unconditional Intertemporal Patterns)
1. For r = 0, the quantity q ( t ; ) is a supermartingale for all :
2. For all r and all and 0 , quantity di¤erences q ( t ; ) q ( t ; 0 ) are martingales.
3. For all r and all > 0 , total charge di¤erences p ( t ; ) p ( t ; 0 ) are submartingales.
Proposition 10 shows that, from the point of view of the agents, supplied quantity levels are expected to decrease over time. Similarly, di¤erences between quantity levels are expected to shrink. At the same time, di¤erences in the total prices charged to two di¤erent buyers are expected to increase. All these …ndings are consistent with the use of introductory pricing by the …rm, which combines lower charges and larger quantities when uncertainty is higher.
While market participants expect beliefs to follow the di¤usion process (1), an external observer (i.e. the econometrician) knows that the evolution of the process d t depends on the true state. Therefore, any empirical prediction about the intertemporal patterns of prices and quantities must be based on the evolution of beliefs conditional on the true quality level. The conditional evolution of beliefs has a non-zero drift component, whose sign depends on the true : In particular, for i 2 f L ; H g, the general …ltering equation (see Liptser and Shiryaev (1977) ) is given by
Conditional on either state, the drift component of any process dh ( t ; ) is no longer uniquely determined by the second partial derivative @ 2 h ( t ; ) = (@ ) 2 , but also depends on the …rst partial derivative @h ( t ; ) =@ . In particular, using expression (19), and factoring out common terms, the sign of the drift component of the process dh ( t ; ) is determined by the following expressions:
These expressions can be used to derive su¢ cient conditions under which the expected change in quantities and total charges has an unambiguous sign. In this case, the concavity of the equilibrium quantities does not su¢ ce to conclude that supplied quantities decrease in expectation for all buyers. However, conditional on the bad state L , quantities are expected to decrease for all high-valuation buyers, whose equilibrium quantities are always increasing.
Proposition 11 (Conditional Intertemporal Patterns)
1. Conditional on the good state ( = H ):
(a) for r = 0, quantities are expected to decrease whenever @q ( t ; ) /@ 0;
(b) for all r and all > 0 , q ( t ; ) q ( t ; 0 ) are submartingales;
(c) for all r and all > 0 , p ( t ; ) p ( t ; 0 ) are submartingales.
Conditional on the bad state ( = L ):
(b) for all r and all > 0 , q ( t ; ) q ( t ; 0 ) are supermartingales.
If we let = H and 0 = L , Proposition 11 suggests that the variety of the o¤ered menu for high quality goods increases over time. Opposite conclusions hold for low quality products.
To summarize, the linear-quadratic model predicts that successful product lines should be characterized by increasing dispersion in prices and in the range of o¤ered quantities. Figure 6(a) shows the results of numerical simulations for the quantity levels o¤ered to two di¤erent buyers, conditional on the true quality being high. Figure 6(b) shows the results of numerical simulations for the total charges paid by the same two buyers. As time passes, the quantity supplied to the lower-valuation buyer decreases. However, total charges stay approximately constant, as the …rm exploits the consumer's increasing willingness to pay per unit of the product. 
Nonlinear Pricing with Competition
The analysis of the monopoly case has allowed us to make precise predictions for the evolution of menus of contracts in markets for experience goods. The monopoly assumption is appropriate in some cases, and the early days of Net ‡ix provide an example. However, often these markets are characterized by imperfect competition, and pricing is strategic. In recent years, for example, Net ‡ix and Blockbuster compete in the market for online DVD rentals. We are therefore motivated to extend our analysis of dynamic menu pricing to a competitive setting. When we introduce strategic pricing in our environment, the role information becomes even more important. The number of units sold by each …rm determines the amount of information obtained by the market about its product. Therefore, from a …rm's point of view, increasing its market share contributes towards both revenue maximization and information production. However, a …rm might also follow the alternative strategy of reducing market penetration, in order to learn more quickly about its competitors.
The main questions we address in this section are: under which conditions are …rms willing to invest in information production about their own product? Are …rms willing to invest in information about other products, or do they assign a negative value to learning about their competitors? How do learning incentives a¤ect the equilibrium menus of contracts? Our answers are based on a duopoly model with one product of uncertain quality and one of well-known quality. We measure the two …rms'relative strength by comparing the quality of the well-known product and the range of possible qualities for the uncertain product. We …nd that …rms always value learning about their own product, as in the monopoly case. We also …nd that a …rm is willing to invest in learning about its competitor, by reducing its market share, provided it does not hold a particularly strong position.
Consider a duopoly model with menu pricing in a horizontal di¤erentiation framework. Firm 1 is new to the market, and produces a good of uncertain quality 1 2 f L ; H g. Firm 2 produces a good of known (safe) quality 2 = s. As in our monopoly analysis, consumers value quality uniformly, but have idiosyncratic preferences for the products of each …rm. Consumers are indexed by their location 2 [0; 1] on a Hotelling line. Firm 1 is located at position 1 and …rm 2 at position 0. A consumer's location determines her idiosyncratic taste for each …rm's product. For a consumer located at , these tastes are given by
We assume linear utility, quadratic costs, and uniformly distributed consumers. Given our formulation for ( 1 ; 2 ), the uniform distribution implies that every consumer's virtual valuation for each product is non-negative. The net utility of a buyer type purchasing q units from …rm j is given by
Note that each consumer's idiosyncratic valuations for the goods of the two …rms are perfectly negatively correlated. In other words, the intensity of a consumer's idiosyncratic taste for her favorite product also determines the intensity of her brand preferences. More speci…cally, consumers with a higher have a higher value for …rm 1 and a lower value for …rm 2. The incentive compatibility constraints then require …rm 1 to provide increasing indirect utility, and …rm 2 to provide decreasing indirect utility, as a function of .
For each …rm j = 1; 2, the incentive compatibility constraint is given by
In particular, if a type x 2 [0; 1] is indi¤erent between the two …rms, incentive compatibility implies …rm 1 will attract all consumers located at x and …rm 2 will serve consumers < x. As …rst shown by Spulber (1989) , …rms o¤er the monopoly quantity levels to customers in their market segment, and compete only through the utility o¤ered to the marginal buyer.
In this framework, only the units sold by …rm 1 constitute experiments for quality. Firm 2 does not directly control the level of experimentation on each type. Therefore, given market shares [0; x] and [x; 1], …rm 2 sets quantity provision at the myopically optimal level. While …rm 2 cannot control experimentation on the intensive margin, it can do so on the extensive margin. By letting …rm 1 acquire a larger market share, …rm 2 can generate more information. Conversely, by pricing more aggressively, …rm 2 can increase its own market share, and reduce the overall level of experimentation. Denote by j j ( ) ; ; q j the pro…t level obtained by …rm j when selling quantity q j to buyer holding beliefs j ( ) about the product j's quality (we clearly have 2 ( ) s). Given a marginal type x 2 [0; 1], the two …rms'HJB equations may be written as rV 1 ( ) = max
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraints and integrating by parts, we obtain formulations for the HJB equations which can be maximized pointwise. The resulting …rst order conditions determine the equilibrium quantity levels as a function of the value of information:
Equations (22) and (23) determine the optimal quantity provision given market shares. When competing over market shares, …rms trade-o¤ the pro…ts made on the marginal buyer ( j u) with the cost of increasing their market shares, given by the increment in every type's utility U 0 j (x) necessary to lure more customers from the competition. Each …rm also considers the impact of a marginal change in market shares in terms of information ( ) V 00 j ( ) q 1 ( ; x). The …rst order conditions determining the equilibrium indi¤erent type x and her indirect utility level u are given by:
For each value of , equations (24) and (25) can be solved for the equilibrium market shares and utility level x ( ) and u ( ) as a function of the marginal values of information ( ) V 00 j ( ). The corresponding myopic equilibrium values x m ( ) and u m ( ) are obtained by ignoring the terms ( ) V 00 j ( ), and solving the same equations. The analytical expressions for the myopic pro…ts allow us to establish conditions under which both …rms assign positive value to information. Analogously to the monopoly case, when beliefs are high, the risky …rm bene…ts in terms of both pro…t margins and market shares, so information is valuable. The same logic does not apply in a straightforward way to …rm 2. The safe …rm might be willing to invest in its own market share, in order to delay learning about its competitor's product. At the same time, when beliefs are low, …rm 2 will also bene…t, both in terms of quantities sold to each buyer, and in terms of market shares. We show that the direction of …rm 2's learning incentives depends on the relative strength of the two …rms. For this reason, let denote the ratio L =s.
Proposition 12 (Value Function Convexity)
1. 1;m ( ) is convex for all .
2. There exists~ > 0 such that, if ~ , then 2;m ( ) is convex:
These results con…rm the intuition that the risky …rm is willing to invest in information generation. Moreover, the safe …rm assigns positive value to information when its relative quality is not particularly high. Finally, convexity extends from the myopic pro…t function to the value function by the same logic as in Theorem 2.
To solve for the Markov equilibrium of this model, we work directly in the undiscounted case. We compute the long run averages v j ( ), as well as the pro…t levels as a function of both values of information. Once we have done so, the strong long-run average criterion allows us to substitute rV j ( ) with v j ( ) in the two HJB equations, and to solve for the values of information ( ) V 00 j ( ). This system must be solved numerically for each : Figure 7 shows the equilibrium market share of …rm 1 as a function the beliefs .
Just as the incentives for learning imply additional sales in the monopoly model, …rm 1's market share lies above the myopic equilibrium level for all values of . Both …rms want to accelerate learning by leaving higher market shares to …rm 1. As in the monopoly case, the 
Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed a …rm's dynamic menu pricing strategy in a market characterized by uncertain product quality and heterogeneous buyers. In this environment, the …rm can pro…tably practice second degree price discrimination. Moreover, by adjusting the quantity levels offered to each buyer, the …rm can manage the ‡ow of information to the market, and balance information production with short-run revenue maximization. Our model yields tractable closed-form solutions that are informative of the qualitative properties of the optimal contract. It also allows us to predict the patterns of the o¤ered prices and quantities over time. The …rm's optimal strategy involves selling larger quantities, even to low-valuation consumers, to generate information when uncertainty is high. As learning occurs, the …rm gradually shifts to a more targeted policy that focuses on high-valuation buyers, possibly excluding low-valuation buyers, to extract more surplus.
The model also has clear welfare implications. The additional informational value of each unit sold induces the …rm to increase the quantity supplied to each buyer beyond the ideal point of a myopic seller. This counters the distortions induced by adverse selection, which reduce quantities below the e¢ cient level. As a consequence, the …rm's incentives to learn lead to an increase in each buyer's utility and in the overall e¢ ciency of the equilibrium quantity allocation. However, the gradual resolution of the uncertainty is not equally bene…cial to all buyers. For example, low-valuation buyers who may be excluded as learning occurs, expect their utility level to decrease over time. Not only them, but also intermediate-valuation buyers, who su¤er from more severe distortions when lower types are excluded. This is in sharp contrast with the e¤ects of learning on the highest-valuation buyers. These buyers enjoy larger numbers of units when the product turns out to be of high quality. Moreover, they assign a higher value to each unit. As a consequence, these buyers bene…t from information, in expectation terms. These di¤erences in the value of information for di¤erent consumers would play an important role in in ‡uencing the timing of buyers'choices, in the context of one-time (durable goods) purchases.
The model developed in this paper focuses almost entirely on learning on the …rm's side, by abstracting from the e¤ects of individual experience on consumers'beliefs and demand. Though considerably more complicated, a model integrating idiosyncratic and aggregate learning would enable the …rm to manage the ‡ow of information to various consumer groups. For example, the …rm might o¤er large quantity discounts to the buyers with the highest valuations, in order to accelerate their learning process, and increase the spread in the distribution of their willingness to pay.
The analysis of strategic environments constitutes a natural extension of this paper. A crucial issue for …rms competing in the environment considered here is whether to invest in learning about their own product, and about competitors'. We have provided some intuition for the main trade-o¤s in a duopoly model. Extending the competitive analysis to richer speci…cations of brand preferences might provide more insights into the characteristics of menu pricing in imperfectly competitive markets for experience goods.
Another question of interest for future research regards the relative pro…tability of menu pricing. Several empirical studies have tried to quantify the pro…t gains due to menu pricing, in comparison to simpler strategies. Our theoretical framework might provide insights into the relationship between …rms' choice of pricing scheme and the di¤usion of information about the product. Quite surprisingly, evidence from the online DVD and the enterprise software market (more speci…cally, online hard drive backup services) suggests that …rms' strategies follow a pattern that moves away from nonlinear pricing, in favor of linear or ‡at-rate contracts, as the market gains familiarity with the product.
Appendix
Micro-founded Model for the Belief Process
We now provide a formal derivation of the law of motion of beliefs about product quality. We start with the case of a …nite number of buyers and discrete time, then extend the model to an in…nite population of agents and continuous time. Let K be the number of buyers, with each buyer's willingness to pay i independently drawn from the distribution F ( i ). Let each unit j purchased by buyer i generate a normally distributed payo¤x ij N ( /K ; 2 /K ).
The utility function of a buyer with type i who consumes q i units is given bỹ
where each x ij is a realization fromx ij . Note that total utility is allowed to depend directly on the number of units consumer. The resulting expected utility function
is consistent with (3) in Section 2. 9 The agent's quantity choice is observable to all players.
Therefore, the outcome of buyer i's experiment provides a normally distributed signal with mean q i /K and variance q i 2 /K . In doing so, we omit the weights i , which pertain to the particular utility level generated by the experiment outcome to buyer i, while the informative content of the experiment is a measure of the product's inherent quality. Alternatively, if each buyer type purchases a di¤erent number of units (i.e. in the absence of bunching), then observing the quantity choice q i is su¢ cient to infer the idiosyncratic component i : If each buyer i consumes a quantity level q ( i ), the market experience is equivalent to a comprehensive signal with mean ( /K )
Denote the average number of units purchased by
As we let the number of draws K from the distribution F ( ) go to in…nity, the average number of units purchased converges to the expected purchased quantity, Q ! R
Thus, the new aggregate market experience is equivalent to a public signalx N (Q ; Q 2 ). As we take the continuous-time limit and use subscripts for time dependence, the ‡ow of new information follows a Brownian motion with drift Q t and variance Q t 2 :
9 This formulation is also consistent with simple mean variance preferences. Therefore, an equivalent formulation for the utility function isŨ ( i ; q i ) = i exp P qi j=1 x ij , which yields a certainty equivalent of i q 2 =K.
With this structure for the information ‡ow, one can use the …ltering equations (see Theorem 9.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1977) ) to derive the evolution of beliefs t :
Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. (1.) By the implicit function theorem and assumption 2, the …rst partial derivatives of the myopic solution are given by
(2.) Apply the envelope theorem and use part (1.) to obtain the following expressions for the derivatives of m ( ):
which ends the proof.
The next lemma shows how to reformulate the HJB equation (11) as a second order di¤er-ential equation.
Lemma 1 (Boundary-Value Problem) Let ( ) be de…ned by (2) and let Q = R q ( ) dF ( ). For all 2 (0; 1), the HJB equation (11) may be written as the following boundary value problem:
with boundary conditions
Proof. The ratio in (26) is well de…ned for all 2 (0; 1), since Q must be positive for any q solving the HJB equation (11). Suppose instead that Q = 0: Then we know q 6 = q m , since q m ( ; ) > 0 for all and . Therefore, ( ; q) < m ( ) : However, in the HJB equation (11), Q = 0 would imply rV ( ) = 0, which is impossible since we know the …rm can guarantee itself m ( ) in every period by setting q = q m . It follows that, if a function V ( ) solves the HJB equation (11), then it must also solve the di¤erential equation (26).
We now state an existence theorem for boundary value problems due to Bernfeld and Lakshmikantham (1974) , which we then use to prove Theorem 1. This result requires the concept of supersolution and subsolution and the introduction of a regularity condition. Consider a second order di¤erential equation of the form
on an open interval J " = ("; 1 ") with " 0. Let V L and V H be functions with continuous second derivatives on J. The function V L is a called a subsolution of (29) 
If these inequalities are strict, these functions are called strict sub-and supersolutions. Fix two functions V H and V L such that V L V H on J. The function G ( ; V; V 0 ) is said to be regular with respect
We can adapt Theorem 1.5.1 in Bernfeld and Lakshmikantham (1974) to our framework, to show existence of a solution.
Lemma 2 (Existence and Uniqueness) Consider an interval J " , ("; 1 "). Suppose V L is a subsolution and V H a supersolution of (29) on J " , and V L V H : Suppose further that G is regular with respect to V L and V H on J " . Given any pair of boundary conditions
29) has a C 2 solution on J " which satis…es the boundary conditions.
where N only depends on C (") and on the functions V L and V H .
We also adapt Corollary 1.5.1 from Bernfeld and Lakshmikantham (1974) to show convergence properties of our solution.
Lemma 3 (Uniform Convergence)
Under the assumptions of Lemma 2, any in…nite sequence of solutions of (29), with V L ( )
has a uniformly convergent subsequence converging to a solution of (29) on J " .
We can now use these results and follow the stepts of Faingold and Sannikov (2007) to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution.
Claim 1
The myopic pro…t function m ( ) /r is a strict subsolution of (26) Claim 2 The long run payo¤ v ( ) /r is a strict supersolution of (26) on (0; 1).
Proof. We know that v ( ) is linear by de…nition, while min
In fact, max q f ( ; q)g , m ( ), is a strictly convex function. Therefore, m ( ) < v ( ) on (0; 1), and v ( ) ( ; q) > 0 for all 2 (0; 1) and all functions q.
Claim 3 Fix an interval J " = ("; 1 "). The boundary value problem (26) is regular with respect to m and v on J " .
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all ( ; V ) 2 J " R + with rV 2 [ m ( ) ; v ( )], the following obtains:
We know that this ratio is always positive and that the …rst term in the numerator is bounded from above by v ( ). Furthermore, we can show that Q is bounded from below by
and thatQ < Q m . Then we would have
which yields a contradiction. In fact,Q < Q m implies the right hand side's denominator is larger than the left hand side's, while ( ; q m ) = m ( ) > ( ;q) implies the numerator of the right hand side is smaller than the left hand side's. Moreover, if the solution to (30) is di¤erent from q m , then it must achieve a lower value than q m does. We can then de…ne the uniform bound as
Proof of Theorem 1. (1.) We know the HJB is equivalent to the boundary value problem (26). Furthermore, this problem satis…es all conditions of Lemma 2. Therefore, for all " > 0, the boundary value problem (26) admits a C 2 solution on ["; 1 "] with boundary conditions
Now let " = 1=n and …x the closed interval J n , [1 /n ; 1 1 /n ]. Similarly, let s n and consider a solution V s ( ) to (26) on the interval [1 /s ; 1 1 /s ]. De…ne a sequence of functions V n s , where for each s j > n, V n s j ( ) is the restriction of V s j ( ) to J n . By Lemma 3, for each n, the sequence V n s has a converging subsequence. By a standard diagonalization argument, there exist a convergent subsequence (which we de…ne as V n ) converging pointwise to a function de…ned on V : (0; 1) ! R. By Lemma 2, jV 0 n j is uniformly bounded, hence on any closed subinterval J n (0; 1), V n ! V uniformly on I: Moreover, for a given interval J n , the bound C (n) de…ned in (31) constitutes a uniform bound on jV 00 n j. Therefore, V 0 n is locally Lipschitz, hence it converges uniformly to V 0 on any closed subinterval J n (0; 1).
The solution to the boundary value problem (26) is unique. Suppose instead there were two solutions V 1 ( ) and V 2 ( ) to (26), with V 1 ( ) 6 = V 2 ( ) : Without loss of generality, suppose
G is strictly increasing in V by the envelope theorem. Since the boundary conditions are identical, the function V 2 V 1 attains a local maximum on (0; 1) with V 2 > V 1 . At the maximum, V 00 2 V 00 1 < 0; therefore, the HJB equations imply G ( ;
(2.) Under assumption 2, the pointwise maximization of (12) admits a unique solution. We know from part (1.) that a solution V ( ) exists. Therefore q ( ; ) is the only policy attaining it. We can then apply the implicit function theorem to obtain the following expressions for the …rst partial derivatives:
,
By assumption (b), these ratios are well de…ned. Moreover, formulation (26) and the envelope theorem imply that (d=d ) ( ( )
, and therefore it is continuous in . ! R + that maximizes the right-hand side of the HJB equation (11). We can therefore apply Theorem 9.1 in Fleming and Soner (2006) and conclude that V ( ) achieves the maximum of (10).
Proof of Theorem 2. From the HJB equation (11), it follows that rV (0) = m (0) and rV (1) = m (1). Consequently, if there exists a point for which m ( ) > rV ( ), then there must also exist a point^ where that the function m rV attains a local maximum. Therefore, 00 m (^ ) rV 00 (^ ) < 0: By Proposition 1, this implies rV is convex at^ . However, whenever V 00 ( ) is positive, the HJB equation
We therefore know that rV ( ) m ( ) for all : A similar argument rules out the case V 00 ( ) < 0 and rV ( ) m ( ) for any : It follows that we must have V 00 ( ) 0 for all .
Proof of Proposition 2. (1.) De…ne the return function W r ( ) , rV ( ), and the function , contradicting r 2 > r 1 and W r 2 ( ) > W r 1 ( ). Since and r both enter (26) multiplicatively, an identical argument shows that W ( ), and hence V ( ), depend negatively on . (2.) Holding ( 0 ) constant while increasing ( H L ) induces a mean-preserving spread in the process t . Since the pro…t function is linear in , the value function ( 0 ) increases, and so does the return function W ( 0 ; r). Since ( ) V 00 ( ) is related to W r ( ) by equation (26), a straightforward application of the envelope theorem delivers that the value of information depends positively on the value of the problem, and hence on the return function W r ( ), and on the di¤erence ( H L ).
Proof of Proposition 3. (1.) Let ( ) = ( ) V 00 ( ). From …rst order condition (13) and the implicit function theorem, we have @q ( ; ; ) @ = 1 ( ) ( ) u 00 (q) c 00 (q) > 0.
Since the value of information ( ) 0 in the myopic case and ( ) > 0 in the forwardlooking case, quantity is higher in the latter setting. (2.) Similarly, quantity is increasing in the value of information ( ) for all and .
Proof of Proposition 4. (1.) Since ( ) V 00 ( ) 0 and ( ) is increasing, for any level q o¤ered at both by the myopic and the forward looking …rm, the corresponding marginal pricep q ( ; q) is lower in the latter case. (2.) Since ( ) is increasing, the higher the value of information, the lower the marginal prices.
Proof of Proposition 5. (1.) Directly substituting ( ) V 00 ( ) = 0 in (14) gives us the expression for q m ( ; ) : From …rst order condition (14), and using constraint (4), we obtain
(2.) Substituting …rst order condition (14) into the objective function, we obtain:
The …rst term in (33) is exactly the expression for the …rm's myopic pro…ts m ( ) in this context. We can then solve explicitly for ( ) V 00 ( ) and obtain
Proof of Proposition 6. (1.) From condition (14), the di¤erence in the quantity levels supplied to types and 0 is equal to ( ) ( ( ) ( 0 )), hence it is linear in .
(2.) Di¤erences between total charges are given by p ( ; ) p ( ; 0 ) which simpli…es to 2 ( ) R 0 s 0 (s) ds: Hence, these di¤erences are positive and convex in for all > 0 .
Proof of Theorem 3. (1.) The …rst term in expression (17) is linear in : The term inside the square root is concave, since its second derivative with respect to is given by
Therefore, q ( ; ) is a concave function of .
(2.) Using the concavity of q ( ; ), and the fact that @ 2 q ( ;
we can identify the critical type~ receiving nonmonotonic quantity provision by setting @q 1;~ =@ = 0. The threshold~ is de…ned by the following equation:
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider …rst order condition (14) for the equilibrium quantity function q ( ; ). Parametrize the solution q ( ; ) and the value function V ( ) by the discount rate r. The …rst derivative with respect to is given by
The second derivative is given by @ 2 q ( ; ; r) 
Therefore, quantity provision is increasing in around = 0 for all types with positive virtual valuation ( ) : (2.) Evaluate expression (34) at = 1 and let W r ( ) = rV ( ; r). We can then write @q ( ; ; r) =@ as
We know the derivative W 0 r (1) is increasing in r, since W r ( ) is convex in and decreasing in r for all , and, at = 1, we have W r (1) = m (1) for all r. It follows the right-hand side of (36) is increasing in r. The right-hand side of (36) is also increasing in , since it depends positively on ( ). In the undiscounted case, we have W 0 r (1) = v 0 (1). When r = 0, we can identify a threshold type~ that solves @q 1;~ ; 0 =@ = 0. Moreover, since W (1; r) is increasing in r, for each " we can …nd a discount rate r " such that jW 0 r (1) v 0 (1)j < " for all r < r " . Since the right-hand side of (36) is increasing in , for any 0 lower than the undiscounted threshold~ , we can …nd a value for the discount rate r low enough so that 0 solves @q (1; 0 ; r) /@ = 0. For all r < r 0 , we then obtain decreasing quantities q ( ; ) at
Proof of Proposition 9. The …rm's HJB equation is given by
which may also be written as
We assume that types are uniformly distributed on [ L ; H ]. Under the uniform distribution f ( ) = 0 ( ) is a constant equal to (2 ( H L )) 1 . We can then integrate out the previous expression, solve the equation
, for the value of information, and obtain the result.
Proof of Proposition 10. Since the drift component of the process dh ( t ; ) is given by
the result follows directly from equation (37), Proposition 6 and Theorem 3.
Proof of Proposition 11. This result follows directly from equations (20) and (21), from Proposition 6, and from Theorem 3.
Proof of Proposition 12.
(1.) Imposing ( ) V 00 j ( ) 0 in conditions (24) and (25), one obtains the following expressions for the myopic equilibrium market shares and utility levels L =s. Therefore, if >~ , then 2;m ( ) is convex: (3.) The proof that convexity of j;m ( ) implies convexity of V i ( ) follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem 2, for each …rm j separately.
